Abraham Lincoln to Richard Yates
Springfield, March 9, 1858
“I have not forgotten my course towards ‘Jim’ for a nomination in 1856. The difficulty then was on a point which has since been measurably superseded by the Dred Scott decision; and he is with us on that.”

Essay


Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865). Sixteenth President of the United States.

"If you approve of the following, contrive to have it appear in some one of the Anti-administration papers down your way --better there than here."


Summary: A fascinating letter from Lincoln's 1858 Senate campaign against Stephen A. Douglas that shows the explosive impact of the Dred Scott decision and the "bleeding Kansas" controversy on both Illinois and the national scene. A politically energized Lincoln plots to bring supporters of Millard Fillmore and the Know-Nothings on board by pitching Lincoln's old friend James H. Matheny, a former Whig, for a seat in Congress. Lincoln starts by asking Yates to plant in the Jacksonville, Ill. newspapers a short statement he's drafted under a pseudonym – "A. republican."

 

Complete Transcript:

Springfield, March 9. 1858.

Hon. R. Yates

My dear Sir:

If you approve of the following contrive to have it appear in some one of the anti-administration papers down your way- better there than here.

"Mr. Editor:

Why may not all anti-administration men in this District vote for James H. Matheny, of Springfield, for Congress? He was opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; was for Fillmore in 1856, but never was a Know-Nothing- He is now opposed to the Lecompton Constitution, and the Dred Scott decision- Who can be more suitable, when a union of Fremont and Fillmore men, is indispensable?

A. republican."

We have thought this over here- The leading Fillmore men here wish to act with us, and they want a name upon which they can bring up their rank and file- It will help us in Sangamon, where we shall be hard run, about members of the Legislature- Think it over, and if you can approve it, give it a start as above-

I have not forgotten my course towards "Jim" [Matheny] for a nomination in 1856 which you also well know- The difficulty then was on a point which has since been measurably superseded by the Dred Scott de [2] decision; and he is with us on that-

[William] Butler says you rather have an eye to getting our old friend Bill Greene on the track- Nothing would please me better, whenever he got on to ground that would suit you, except it would give us no access to the Fillmore votes. Don't you see? We must have some one who will reach the Fillmore men, both for the direct and the incidental effect.

I wish you would see Nult [Lynn McNulty] Greene, and present this view to him. Point out to him the necessities of the case, and also how the question, as to "Jim" is varied since 1856.

Let this be strictly confidential.

Yours as ever,

A. Lincoln

[docket:] A. Lincoln


Historical Background: The mythologizing of Abraham Lincoln, which began almost immediately after his assassination, placed him in the pantheon of American "gods" alongside George Washington. But behind the legend of "Honest Abe" – country raconteur, log-cabin president, compassionate father figure and, finally, national martyr – was a shrewd legal mind, astute politician and adept student of human psychology. This letter reveals Lincoln as a consummate political strategist.

In 1854, opposition to the expansion of slavery under the Kansas-Nebraska Act gave birth to the Republican Party. Lincoln allied himself with the new political movement, while old friend James H. Matheny stayed firmly with the Whigs, supporting Millard Fillmore in the presidential election. As a result, Lincoln opposed Matheny 's 1856 Congressional bid. But Chief Justice Roger Taney 's decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford soon changed the political landscape.


Taney ruled in March 1857 that Dred Scott, a slave, could not sue for his freedom since Negroes had "no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Taney went on to declare the 1820 Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, giving license to expand slavery throughout the Midwest and western territories of the United States. Lincoln thought the decision did "obvious violence to the plain unmistakable language of the Declaration" of Independence and its recognition that all men were created equal and endowed with unalienable rights. "If its framers could rise from their graves," Lincoln added, "they could not at all recognize it" (quoted in Donald, Lincoln, 201 – from Lincoln's June 26, 1857 speech in Springfield, Ill.).

Taken together with Stephen A. Douglas's support of the Lecompton Constitution, submitted to Congress by pro-slavery settlers in Kansas, Lincoln saw a consistent pattern by Democratic Party leaders to aid the advance of slavery. Old political divisions, such as the differences over immigration that had pitted Republicans against Millard Fillmore's Know-Nothings in 1856, shriveled to insignificance in the face of the threat posed by the "Slave Power." Though Matheny opposed Taney 's decision and had allied himself with the Republicans, he still had credibility among the old Know-Nothings. Matheny, Lincoln realized, could bring together different political factions to help defeat pro-slavery forces. In this letter, Lincoln offers a strategy to use Matheny 's influence to reach "the Fillmore men, both for the direct and the incidental effect" – presumably, a Republican victory (including a Senate seat for Lincoln) as well as a defeat of slavery expansionists. Matheny 's influence would extend into the state legislature – a crucial factor, since it was the legislature rather than popular vote that decided Senatorial elections in 19th-century America.

The Lincoln-Douglas Debates, held during the 1858 Illinois Senate campaign, aired the fundamental differences between the new Republican Party, which opposed the extension of slavery into the free territories of the West; and the Democratic Party, which largely supported it. Lincoln called for the restriction of slavery to its current boundaries; Douglas advocated "Popular Sovereignty," the right of each territory to determine whether or not slavery would be allowed.

In the end, the Republican position – and Lincoln's strategy – proved unsuccessful. Though the Republicans took the popular vote, apportionment of representatives in the state strongly favored Democratic districts. The Republicans were unable to shift enough power their way in the Illinois legislature. Voting proceeded solidly along party lines, and the General Assembly elected Douglas over Lincoln by a vote of 54 to 46.


Though he lost the senatorial election, Lincoln outmaneuvered Douglas during the campaign by forcing him to spell out his position on slavery. The unprecedented series of debates transformed Lincoln from a regional politician to a nationally recognized leader of the Republican Party, paving the way for his 1860 presidential run.

 

Richard Yates (1815-1873), a Lincoln friend from New Salem, had followed a similar career path, serving as a lawyer, state legislator and member of Congress. It was Yates 's 1854 re-election campaign that helped get Lincoln back into politics after a four-year hiatus following his own failed Congressional re-election bid in 1850. Yates, an outspoken critic of Stephen A. Douglas 's Kansas-Nebraska legislation, lost his seat in Congress, despite Lincoln's support. Yates went on to assist Lincoln's 1860 and 1864 presidential campaigns. He served as governor of Illinois from 1861-1865, marshaling firm support and a great many troops for the Union, followed by one term in the Senate as a Radical Republican.

James H. Matheny (1818-1890), another longtime Lincoln friend, had served under William "Slicky Bill" Greene at the Springfield courthouse. Matheny had been best man at Lincoln's wedding to Mary Todd (a ceremony, as Matheny later recalled, that Lincoln participated in under some duress). When Lincoln allied himself with the new Republican party in 1856, Matheny stayed with the Whigs, running for Congress as that party 's candidate. It was Matheny 's mention of a deal between Lincoln and Lyman Trumbull to split Senate seats (Trumbull to get one in 1854, and Lincoln to take Douglas 's four years later) that Douglas repeatedly cited as a corrupt bargain in his 1858 debates with Lincoln. Matheny lost his 1858 Congressional bid to Democrat Thomas L. Harris.

William Butler (1797-1876) was an early mentor to Lincoln, helping him pay off his debts and encouraging him in his study of law. After a politically-related squabble in the late 1840s, the two men renewed their friendship. William Graham "Slicky Bill" Greene (1812-1894), once a fellow clerk with Lincoln at Offut's general store and mill in New Salem, had coached the future president in grammar and mathematics. He later served as court clerk in Springfield, and went on to become a successful merchant, banker and railroad executive.

_________________________________________________________________


References:
www.mrlincolnandfriends.org. (excellent bios of Matheny, Yates et al).
Basler, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 10:28-29;
Neely, Mark. The Abraham Lincoln Encyclopedia.
Krenkel, John H. Richard Yates, Civil War Governor, p. 211-213

Abraham Lincoln. Autograph Letter Signed ("A. Lincoln") to Richard Yates, Springfield. March 9, 1858. 2 pp. docket.

Condition:
Some show-through, very lightly and expertly silked, tipped to another sheet.